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We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, banks￿ reserve holdings
and aggregate liquidity. Banks compete in a diﬀerentiated loan market, hold reserves
against liquidity shocks, and re￿nance in the interbank market. A merger creates an
internal money market that induces ￿nancial cost advantages and may increase reserve
holdings. We assess changes in liquidity risk and expected liquidity needs for each bank
and for the banking system. Large mergers tend to increase expected aggregate liquidity
needs, and thus the liquidity provision by the central bank. Comparative statics suggest
that a more competitive environment moderates this eﬀect.
JEL Classi￿cation: D43, G21, G28, L13
Keywords: Credit market competition, bank reserves, internal money market, bank-
ing system liquidity
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The last decade has witnessed an intense process of consolidation in the financial sectors of
many industrial countries. This “merger movement” was particularly concentrated among
banking firms and occurred mostly within national borders. As a consequence, many
countries reached a situation of high banking sector concentration or faced a further
deterioration of an already concentrated sector. Often a small number of large banks
constitutes more than two thirds of the national banking sector (e.g. measured by deposits).
The present paper is the first theoretical exploration of the potential joint consequences of this
extensive consolidation process for the competitiveness of bank intermediation, for reserve
management and for banking system liquidity. The results are suggestive for competition
policies, monetary implementation and prudential supervision.
Market power in loan markets may have adverse effects on borrower welfare, real investment
and growth if not counterbalanced by substantial efficiency gains. Available evidence
indicates that mergers often lead to upward pressure on loan rates, suggesting that efficiency
gains are relatively small. Individual banks’ reserve holdings reflect their fundamental role as
liquidity providers, as they determine their ability to meet depositors’ unexpected withdrawals
and consumption needs. From a micro-prudential perspective, thus, consolidation may change
individual banks’ resiliency against liquidity shocks through changes in their reserve
holdings. 
Banking system liquidity is important in several respects. First, large liquidity fluctuations
may conflict with the objectives of central banks in money market operations. In particular,
frequent large liquidity injections can be inconsistent with a lean, simple and transparent
implementation of monetary policy; and they may strain banks’ collateral pools, thus
complicating risk management. Second, from a macro-prudential perspective consolidation
may increase banking system liquidity fluctuations. Hence, in the absence of timely and
accurate central bank operations, large liquidity shortages may sometimes endanger the
stability of the banking system. In line with these arguments, the 2001 G-10 “Report on
Consolidation in the Financial Sector” expresses the concern that “...by internalising what had
previously been interbank transactions, consolidation could reduce the liquidity of the market
for central bank reserves, making it less efficient in reallocating balances across institutions
and increasing market volatility”.
To address these issues we develop a model which allows for the joint analysis of the impact
of bank mergers on credit market competition, individual and aggregate liquidity
ECB • Working Paper No 292 • November 2003 5management. Banks raise retail deposits to invest in long-term loans to entrepreneurs and in
liquid short-term assets (reserves). On the loan market banks compete in prices and retain
some market power through differentiation. They hold reserves as a cushion against stochastic
liquidity shocks (depositors’ withdrawals) distributed independently across banks. If liquidity
demand exceeds reserves, a bank can fund the difference by borrowing in the interbank
(money) market, which redistributes reserves from banks with excess liquidity to banks with
shortages. When the aggregate demand for liquidity exceeds the total stock of available
reserves, the central bank intervenes to provide the missing liquidity.
The occurrence of a merger modifies banks’ behaviour concerning both liquidity management
and loan market competition. As regards the former, an important feature of our analysis is
that a merger creates an internal money market where liquidity can be freely reshuffled.
Surprisingly, we find that this may sometimes lead the merged banks to increase reserve
holdings. On the one hand, the possibility to reshuffle reserves internally increases their
marginal value, which implies such upward pressure. On the other hand, the typical
diversification effect related to the pooling of independent liquidity shocks induces the
merged banks to reduce reserves. We show that the internalisation effect dominates when the
relative cost of refinancing on the interbank market is low, since then banks hold few reserves
and face a high probability of needing additional reserves. When the relative cost of
refinancing is high, the diversification effect dominates and banks reduce reserve holdings. In
both circumstances, however, the merged banks always improve their liquidity situation.
The effect of a merger on the loan market depends on the relative strength of the increase in
market power and potential cost efficiency gains. A merger allows the banks involved to
internalise the effect of their pricing on the demand of their companion bank and to set higher
loan rates. At the same time, potential efficiency gains make them more aggressive in setting
loan rates. As known from the industrial organisation literature, the overall effect on loan
rates depends on how strong these cost reductions are. The novelty in our model is that, by
lowering interbank refinancing costs, the internal money market generates endogenous
financial cost efficiencies, which reduce the anti-competitive effects of bank mergers.
Loan market shares across banks move in line with loan rates. The merged banks gain market
shares at the expense of competitors when loan rates fall, and lose market shares otherwise.
Thus, consolidation changes banks’ balance sheets, creating (or reducing) heterogeneity
through changes in equilibrium loan market shares. This has an important effect on banking
system liquidity, since changes in the size distribution of banks’ balance sheets affect
ECB • Working Paper No 292 • November 2003 6aggregate liquidity demand and, hence, expected aggregate liquidity needs (the expected
amount of publicly provided liquidity the system needs).
We identify two channels through which mergers affect banking system liquidity. The reserve
channel is directly related to individual banks’ changes in reserve holdings, as described
above. When the relative cost of refinancing on the interbank market is low, a merger leads
banks to increase reserves, thus pushing up aggregate liquidity supply and reducing the
expected liquidity needs of the system. The opposite happens when the relative cost of
refinancing is high. The asymmetry channel is linked to changes in the heterogeneity of
banks’ balance sheets generated by mergers occurring in imperfectly competitive
environments. We show that greater heterogeneity increases the variance of the aggregate
liquidity demand, which leads to higher expected aggregate liquidity needs.
Depending on the size of the relative cost of refinancing, the reserve and asymmetry channels
can work in the same or opposite directions. When interbank refinancing is relatively
expensive, the two channels lead to a deterioration of aggregate liquidity in the banking
system. When interbank refinancing is relatively inexpensive, the two channels push instead
in opposite directions and the net effect on aggregate liquidity depends on their relative
strength. We conclude that if we face a merger wave that leads to a “polarisation” of the
banking system with large and small institutions, this wave is likely to generate an adverse
outcome in terms of aggregate liquidity need, particularly where interbank refinancing is
more costly. In contrast, a merger movement that leaves behind relatively little heterogeneity
in banks’ balance sheets may leave interbank market liquidity unaffected or even improve it.
This result is noteworthy given that the banking sector consolidation of the 1990s led to
greater asymmetry between the largest and smaller banks in most industrial countries.
To further explore the role of competition in the aggregate liquidity effects of bank mergers,
we undertake a comparative statics exercise, varying the competition parameters of the
model. It turns out that in the most plausible parameter configurations, a more competitive
environment is favourable for banking system liquidity. More banks or a greater
substitutability of loans decrease the asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets caused by a merger,
thus reducing expected aggregate liquidity needs.
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The last decade has witnessed an intense process of consolidation in the ￿nancial sector of
many industrial countries. This ￿merger movement￿, documented in a number of papers and
oﬃcial reports, was particularly concentrated among banking ￿rms and occurred mostly
within national borders.1 As shown in Figure 1, in Canada, Italy and Japan more than half
the average number of banks combined forces over the 1990s.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As a consequence, many countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and
Sweden) reached a situation of high banking sector concentration or faced a further deteri-
oration of an already concentrated sector. As it can be seen from Table 1, a small number
of large banks often constitutes more than 70 per cent of the national banking sector.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
This paper is the ￿rst theoretical exploration of the potential joint consequences of this ex-
tensive consolidation process for the competitiveness of bank intermediation, reserve man-
agement and banking system liquidity.
These three issues are important. Market power in loan markets may have adverse
eﬀects on borrower welfare, real investment and growth if not counterbalanced by substantial
eﬃciency gains.2 Available evidence indicates that mergers often lead to upward pressure
on loan rates, suggesting that eﬃciency gains are relatively small.3
Individual banks￿ reserve holdings re￿ect their fundamental role as liquidity providers, as
they determine their ability to meet depositors￿ unexpected withdrawals and consumption
needs. From a micro-prudential perspective, thus, consolidation may change individual
banks￿ resiliency against liquidity shocks through changes in their reserve holdings.
Banking system liquidity is important in several respects. First, large liquidity ￿uc-
tuations may con￿ict with the objectives of central banks in money market operations.
In particular, frequent large liquidity injections can be inconsistent with a lean, simple and
transparent implementation of monetary policy; and they may strain banks￿ collateral pools,
thus complicating risk management. Second, from a macro-prudential perspective consoli-
dation may increase banking system liquidity ￿uctuations. Hence, in the absence of timely
and accurate central bank operations, large liquidity shortages may sometimes endanger
the stability of the banking system. In line with these arguments, the G-10 ￿Report on
Consolidation in the Financial Sector￿ expresses the concern that ￿...by internalizing what
1See e.g., Boyd and Graham (1996), Berger et al. (1999), Hanweck and Shull (1999), Dermine (2000);
ECB (2000), OECD (2000) and Group of Ten (2001).
2For example, Spagnolo (2000) shows that poor credit market competition may hinder competition in the
whole economy, and Cetorelli (2002) provides empirical evidence of this eﬀect.
3See, e.g., the surveys by Rhoades (1998) and Carletti et al. (2002).
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market for central bank reserves, making it less eﬃcient in reallocating balances across
institutions and increasing market volatility￿ (Group of Ten, 2001, p. 20).
To address these issues we develop a model which allows for the joint analysis of the
impact of bank mergers on credit market competition, individual and aggregate liquidity
management. Banks raise retail deposits to invest in long-term loans to entrepreneurs and
in liquid short-term assets (reserves). On the loan market banks compete in prices and
retain some market power through diﬀerentiation. They hold reserves as a cushion against
stochastic liquidity shocks (depositors￿ withdrawals) distributed independently across banks.
If liquidity demand exceeds reserves, a bank can fund the diﬀerence by borrowing in the
interbank (or money) market, which redistributes reserves from banks with excess liquidity
to banks with shortages. When the aggregate demand for liquidity exceeds the total stock
of available reserves, the central bank intervenes to provide the missing liquidity.
Banks choose reserves balancing the marginal bene￿t of lower interbank re￿nancing
needs with the marginal cost of having to raise more deposits. At the optimum, reserve
holdings grow when the cost of re￿nancing increases relative to the cost of raising deposit.
Equilibrium loan rates are set at the level that equates the marginal revenue of granting
loans with the marginal cost of providing them, re￿nancing in the interbank market and
raising deposits.
The occurrence of a merger modi￿es banks￿ behavior concerning both liquidity manage-
ment and loan market competition. As regards the former, an important feature of our
analysis is that a merger creates an internal money market where liquidity can be freely
reshuﬄed. Surprisingly, we ￿nd that this may lead the merged banks to increase reserve
holdings. On the one hand, the typical diversi￿cation eﬀect related to the pooling of their in-
dependent liquidity shocks induces the merged banks to reduce reserves. On the other hand,
the possibility to reshuﬄe reserves internally increases their marginal value, thus leading the
merged banks to increase reserves. We show that this internalization eﬀect dominates when
t h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ￿nancing on the interbank market is low, since then banks hold few
reserves and face a high probability of needing additional reserves. When the relative cost of
re￿nancing is high, the diversi￿cation eﬀect dominates and banks reduce reserve holdings.
In both circumstances, however, the merged banks always improve their liquidity situation,
in terms of both liquidity risk (the probability of facing a liquidity shortage) and expected
liquidity needed.
The eﬀect of a merger on the loan market depends on the relative strength of the increase
in market power and potential cost eﬃciency gains. A merger allows the banks involved
to internalize the eﬀect of their pricing on the demand of their companion bank and to
set, ceteris paribus, higher loan rates. At the same time, potential eﬃciency gains make
them more aggressive in setting loan rates. As known from the industrial organization
literature, the overall eﬀect on loan rates depends on how strong these cost reductions are.
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market generates endogenous ￿nancial cost eﬃciencies, which reduce, ceteris paribus, the
anti-competitive eﬀects of mergers between banks.
Loan market shares across banks move in line with loan rates. The merged banks
gain market shares at the expense of competitors when loan rates fall, and lose market
shares otherwise. Thus, consolidation changes banks￿ balance sheets, creating (or reducing)
heterogeneity through changes in equilibrium loan market shares. This has an important
eﬀect on banking system liquidity, since changes in the size distribution of banks￿ balance
sheets aﬀect aggregate liquidity demand and thus expected aggregate liquidity needs (the
expected amount of publicly provided liquidity the system needs).
We identify two channels through which mergers aﬀect banking system liquidity. The
reserve channel is directly related to individual banks￿ changes in reserve holdings, as de-
scribed earlier. When the relative cost of re￿nancing on the interbank market is low, a
merger leads banks to increase reserves, thus pushing up aggregate liquidity supply and re-
d u c i n gt h ee x p e c t e dl i q u i d i t yn e e d so ft h es y s t e m .T h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n sw h e nt h er e l a t i v e
cost of re￿nancing is high. The asymmetry channel is linked to changes in the heterogeneity
of banks￿ balance sheets generated by mergers occurring in imperfectly competitive environ-
ments. We show that greater heterogeneity increases the variance of the aggregate liquidity
demand, thus leading, ceteris paribus, to higher expected aggregate liquidity needs.
Depending on the size of the relative cost of re￿nancing, the reserve and asymmetry
channels can then work in the same or opposite directions. When interbank re￿nancing is
relatively expensive, the two channels lead to a deterioration of aggregate liquidity in the
banking system. Both banks￿ lower reserves and greater balance sheet heterogeneity increase
expected aggregate liquidity needs. When interbank re￿nancing is relatively inexpensive,
the two channels push instead in opposite directions and the net eﬀect on aggregate liquidity
depends on their relative strength. We conclude that if we face a merger wave that leads to
a ￿polarization￿ of the banking system with large and small institutions, this wave is likely
to generate an adverse outcome in terms of aggregate liquidity need, particularly where
interbank re￿nancing is more costly. In contrast, a merger movement that leaves behind
relatively little heterogeneity in banks￿ balance sheets may leave interbank market liquidity
unaﬀected or even improve it. This result is particularly noteworthy in the light of Table 1,
which suggests that the banking sector consolidation of the 1990s led to greater asymmetry
between the largest and smaller banks in most industrial countries.
To further explore the role of competition in the aggregate liquidity eﬀects of bank
mergers, we undertake a comparative statics exercise varying the competition parameters
of the model. It turns out that in the most plausible parameter con￿gurations, a more
competitive environment is favorable for banking system liquidity. More banks or a greater
substitutability of loans decrease the asymmetry in banks￿ balance sheets caused by a merger,
thus reducing, ceteris paribus, expected aggregate liquidity needs.
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nous mergers under imperfect competition, in particular on Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
and Perry and Porter (1985), and combines it with the analysis of ￿nancial intermediation
and market liquidity. Starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is an important ￿eld
of research studying the role of banks as liquidity providers. Recent examples are Kashyap,
Rajan and Stein (2002), who describe the links between banks￿ liquidity provision to depos-
itors and their liquidity provision to borrowers through credit lines; and Diamond (1997),
who discusses the relationship between the activities of Diamond-and-Dybvig-type banks
and liquidity of ￿nancial markets. Concerning liquidity provision by public authorities,
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) analyze the role of government debt management in meeting
the liquidity needs of the productive sector. This literature, however, has not yet considered
the implications of imperfect competition and ￿nancial consolidation for private and public
provision of liquidity.
Several authors have studied the rationale for an interbank market and its eﬀect on
reserve holdings. For example, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) show that banks can optimally
cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending reserves; but they also argue that
moral hazard and adverse selection lead to under-investment in reserves. Bhattacharya
and Fulghieri (1994) clarify that, if the timing of returns on reserves is uncertain, reserve
holdings can instead be excessive. These authors argue that the central bank has a role in
healing these imperfections. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) analyze how
small unexpected liquidity shocks can lead to liquidity shortages in the banking system and
thus, in the absence of a central bank, to contagious crises. We discuss how the likelihood
and the extent of such shortages vary with changes in market structure when a central bank
stands ready to oﬀset private market liquidity ￿uctuations.
The paper is also related to the literature on ￿rms￿ internal capital markets. Gertner
et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) discuss the potentially eﬃciency-enhancing role of internal
capital markets, while Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) warn that these
may become ineﬃcient if internal incentive problems and power struggles lead to excessive
cross-divisional subsidies. The empirical results of Graham et al. (2002) suggest, however,
that ￿value destruction￿ in ￿rms is not related to consolidation. Regarding banks, Houston et
al. (1997) provide evidence that loan growth at subsidiaries of US bank holding companies
(BHCs) is more sensitive to the holding company￿s cash ￿ow than to the subsidiaries￿ own
cash ￿ow. Campello (2002) shows that the funding of loans by small aﬃliates of US BHCs
is less sensitive to aﬃliate-level cash ￿ows than independent banks of comparable size.
Focusing on short-term assets, we show how the creation of an internal money market
can cushion external liquidity shocks and aﬀect banks￿ reserve choices and banking system
liquidity. We also show that the ￿nancial cost advantages associated with the internal money
market lead the merged banks, ceteris paribus, to be more aggressive on the loan market.
ECB • Working Paper No 292 • November 2003 11solvency problems in our model, in practice severe liquidity problems may cause default
if there is no adequate intervention. The ￿charter value￿ literature studies the relationship
between competition and bank stability, arguing that some monopoly rents are desirable
to reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990; Hellman et al., 2000,
and Matutes and Vives, 2000). Perotti and Suarez (2002) argue that a succession of bank
takeovers and an active entry policy may ensure stability, while keeping competition intact.
More recent empirical work indicates that less competitive banking systems are not nec-
essarily more stable.4 Our model links monopoly rents in loan competition to individual
and aggregate liquidity ￿uctuations, suggesting that bank competition may reduce liquidity
shortages.
T h er e m i n d e ro ft h ep a p e ri ss t r u c t u r e da sf o l l o w s .S e c t i o n2s e t su pt h em o d e l .S e c t i o n3
derives the equilibrium before a merger (￿status quo￿). The subsequent section characterizes
the eﬀects of the merger on individual banks￿ behavior, and Section 5 looks at its implications
for aggregate liquidity. Comparative statics analysis is conducted in Section 7. The ￿nal
section discusses the robustness of the results.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a three date ( =0 12) economy with three classes of risk neutral agents: 
banks (3), numerous entrepreneurs, and numerous individuals. At date 0 banks raise
funds from individuals in the form of retail deposits, and invest the proceeds in loans to
entrepreneurs and liquid short-term assets denoted as reserves. Thus, the balance sheet for
each bank  is
 +  = ,( 1 )
where  denotes loans,  reserves, and  deposits.
Competition in the loan market
Banks oﬀer diﬀerentiated loans and compete in prices. The diﬀerentiation of loans may
emerge from long-term lending relationships (see, e.g., Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992), special-
ization in certain types of lending (e.g., to small/large ￿rms or to diﬀerent sectors) or in
certain geographical areas. Following Shubik and Levitan (1980), we assume that each bank
 faces a linear demand for loans given by













4Carletti and Hartmann (2003) provide a more comprehensive review of the literature on competition and
stability in banking.
Aggregate liquidity risk is related to ￿nancial stability. Although we are not covering
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 ≥ 0 represents the degree of substitutability of loans. The larger 
 the more
substitutable are the loans. Note that expression (2) implies a constant aggregate demand
for loans
P
=1  = 	, as in Salop (1979).
Processing loans involves a per-unit provision cost , which can be thought of as a set
up cost or a monitoring cost. Loans mature at date 2 and yield nothing if liquidated before
maturity.
Deposits, individual liquidity shocks and reserve holdings
Banks raise deposits in  distinct ￿regions￿. A region can be interpreted as a geographical
area, a speci￿c segment of the population, or an industry sector in which a bank specializes
for its deposit business. There is a large number of potential depositors in every region,
each endowed with one unit of funds at date 0. Depositors are oﬀered demandable contracts,
which pay just the initial investment in case of withdrawal at date 1 and a (net) rate  at
date 2. The deposit rate  can be thought of as the reservation value of depositors (the
return of another investment opportunity), or, alternatively, as the equilibrium rate in a
competition game between banks and other deposit-taking ￿nancial institutions.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a fraction  of depositors at each bank develops a
preference for early consumption, and withdraws at date 1. The remaining 1− depositors
value consumption only at date 2, and leave their funds at the bank a period longer.5 The
fraction  is assumed to be stochastic; speci￿cally,  is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1, and is i.i.d. across banks.6 This introduces uncertainty at the level of each individual
bank and in the aggregate. All uncertainty is resolved at date 1, when liquidity shocks
materialize.
Each bank keeps reserves  to face its date 1 demand for liquidity  = .R e s e r v e s
represent a storage technology that transfers the value of investment from one period to
the next. We may think of cash, reserve holdings at the central bank, or even short-term
government securities, and other safe and low yielding assets. (The interest rate on reserves
needs not be zero.)
The stochastic nature of  implies that the realized demand for liquidity  may exceed
or fall short of . Denoting as () the density function of ,f r o ma ne xa n t ep e r s p e c t i v e
each bank faces a liquidity risk − the probability to experience a liquidity shortage at date
5The fraction  can also be interpreted as a regional macro shock. For example, weather conditions may
change the general consumption needs in a region, so that each depositor withdraws a fraction  of his initial
investment.
6The simplifying assumption that liquidity shocks are independent across banks is by no means necessary.
As long as the shocks are not perfectly correlated, all our results below remain valid, also for the case of
dependence. In the extreme case of perfectly correlated liquidity shocks the problem is not interesting, as the
rationale for a money market disappears. We like to thank an anonymous working paper referee for having
pointed out that this should be clari￿ed.
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and has expected liquidity needs − the expected size of liquidity shortage that needs to be




( − )().( 4 )
Interbank re￿nancing and aggregate liquidity
As liquidity shocks are independent across banks, there is room for reshuﬄing liquidity
from banks with reserve excesses (  ) to banks with reserve shortages (  )o n
an interbank (or money) market.7 The presence of aggregate uncertainty implies, however,
that there may be an aggregate shortage or an aggregate excess of liquidity. An aggregate
shortage of private liquidity occurs whenever the aggregate demand for liquidity is higher








Denoting as  =
P
=1  the aggregate demand for liquidity with density function (),




























In order to concentrate on public liquidity management, we assume that the central bank
supplies (or demands) the liquidity necessary to clear the interbank market and avoid a
crisis, and that the loan market is suﬃciently pro￿table for banks to borrow in the interbank
market against loan market pro￿ts. This ensures that the interbank market is stable and
clears at the rate justi￿ed by the current stance of monetary policy. Banks can then borrow
at date 1 at a ￿xed rate , either from other banks or from the central bank, and lend
7We can think of it in terms of wholesale overnight deposits, such as the interbank overnight deposit
market in the euro area and the Fed funds market in the United States.
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,w h e r e  .8 The aggregate liquidity risk (6) and the expected
aggregate liquidity needs (7) can then be interpreted as measures of the degree to which the
banking system depends on public supply of liquidity.
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 2. At date 0 banks compete in prices
in the loan market, choose reserve holdings, and raise deposits. After liquidity shocks
materialize at date 1, banks borrow or lend in the interbank market, which is completed by
the central bank if necessary. At date 2 loans mature, and remaining claims from deposits
and interbank market are settled.
Figure 2: Timing of the model
T=0 T=1 T=2
|| |
price competition shocks  materialize, loans mature,
in the loan market, banks operate in the claims are
choice of , interbank market, and settled, and
 =  +  are raised central bank intervenes pro￿ts materialize
3 The Status Quo
In this section we characterize the equilibrium when all banks are identical. We start with
noting two features of the model. First, bank runs never occur in this model. The illiquidity
of loans together with   0 guarantees that depositors withdraw prematurely only if hit
by liquidity shocks. Second, because banks can always repay depositors and creditors in the
interbank market, we can directly focus on the date 0 maximization problem.
With these considerations in mind, at date 0 each bank  chooses the loan rate 
 and the
reserves  so as to maximize the following expected pro￿t (for simplicity, the intertemporal









The ￿rst term in (8) represents the pro￿t from the loan market, the second term is the
expected pro￿t from lending at date 1 when the bank is in excess of reserves, the third
8For interbank lending the diﬀerence between 
 and 
 re￿ects transaction costs, such as bid-ask
spreads charged by market makers or brokers (see e.g., Hartmann et al., 2001). For transactions with the
central bank we can interpret 
 and 
 as the policy rates set for standing facilities. For example, the
US Federal Reserve￿s (Fed) new primary credit facility and the European Central Bank￿s (ECB) marginal
lending facility allow sound banks to receive overnight credit. The ECB oﬀers also an overnight deposit
facility (paying a much lower rate) for banks with excess liquidity, whereas banks￿ holdings of overnight
balances with the Fed do not earn any interest. For simplicity, we assume that market and central bank
borrowing and lending rates are identical, but the working of our model and the qualitative results do not
hinge on this assumption.
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fourth term is the expected repayment to depositors leaving their funds until date 2. Taken
together, the last two terms represent bank ￿s ￿nancing costs.
For expositional convenience, and without loss of generality, we set  =0 , and denote
 simply as . (No qualitative result depends on this simpli￿cation, which also captures
the idea that banks do not keep reserves to make pro￿ts, but only to protect themselves
against liquidity shocks.)
The following proposition characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in the status quo. All
proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 The symmetric status quo equilibrium is characterized as follows:




 ) + 	
,w h e r e	
 =  +
√
;
2. It has a loan market share 	
 = 	;


















The equilibrium loan rate 
	
 diverges from the total marginal cost 	
 via the mark up

( −1
 ). This decreases with both the number of banks  and the loan substitutability
parameter 
, while it increases with the level of loan demand 	. The total marginal cost
includes the loan provision cost  and the marginal ￿nancing costs
√
,i . e . ,t h es u mo f
the expected cost of re￿nancing and of raising deposits.
Equilibrium reserve holdings balance the marginal bene￿t of reducing the expected cost
of re￿nancing with the marginal cost of increasing deposits, and they are positive as long
as   . We restrict our attention to this plausible case, the other case being also
theoretically uninteresting. Both reserves and deposits increase with the interbank rate 
and with the demand for loans 	




 is the relative cost of re￿nancing, which will play an important role as we go along. It
is a measure of how costly re￿nancing at date 1 is relative to raising deposits and holding
reserves at date 0.
Two further implications of Proposition 1 are important for comparing this equilibrium
with the post-merger equilibrium in the next section. First, using the balance sheet equality
















Note that, whereas the equilibrium reserve holdings in Proposition 1 depend on the loan
market outcome, the reserve-deposit ratio in (9) does not. To exploit this simpli￿cation, in
ECB • Working Paper No 292 • November 2003 16what follows we will mostly focus on this ratio. Second, Proposition 1 implies the following
corollary.




















The equilibrium liquidity risk 	
 is increasing in the deposit rate  and decreasing in the
interbank rate . An increase in  induces banks to reduce reserves and thus deposits.
Lower reserves mean lower protection against early liquidity demand, while lower deposits
reduce the size of such demand. As liquidity shocks hit only a fraction  of deposits, the
negative eﬀect of lower reserves dominates, so that individual liquidity risk 	
 increases. A
similar mechanism explains the negative dependence of 	
 on ,a sw e l la st h er e l a t i o n s h i p s
between the expected liquidity needs 	
, the rates  and , and the equilibrium demand
for loans 	
.
4T h e E ﬀects of a Merger on Banks￿ Behavior
In this section we analyze what happens at the individual bank level when a merger takes
place. The behavior of the merged banks changes in several ways. First, they can exchange
reserves internally, which changes their way to insure against liquidity risk. Second, this
￿internal money market￿ gives them a ￿nancing cost advantage, whose size is endogenously
determined. Third, the merged banks may enjoy cost eﬃciencies in terms of lower loan
provision costs. Fourth, they gain market power in setting loan rates. All these factors
aﬀect banks￿ equilibrium balance sheets and, in turn, the demand and supply of liquidity.
W eb e g i nw i t hh o wt h em e r g e rm o d i ￿es banks￿ reserve holdings, and then we turn to its
eﬀects on loan market competition. As noted earlier, one can look at these issues separately
by focussing on the optimal reserve-deposit ratios, rather than on the absolute levels of
reserves.
4.1 Internal Money Market and Choice of Reserves
We note ￿rst that the merger does not aﬀect the optimal reserve-deposit ratio of the  −2
competitors. As they have the same cost structure as in the status quo, they still choose
their reserve-deposit ratios according to (9), i.e.,  = 	
.
By contrast, the merged banks, say bank 1 and bank 2, choose a diﬀerent reserve-deposit
ratio. As their liquidity shocks are independently distributed, they can pool their reserves
to meet the total demand for liquidity. Thus, as long as the two banks continue to raise
deposits in two separate regions, the merger leaves room for an internal money market in
which they can reshuﬄe reserves according to their respective needs. For simplicity, we
assume a ￿perfect￿ internal money market, so that exchanging reserves internally involves
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market is lower than the interbank rate.)
Let  = 11 + 22 be the total demand for liquidity of the merged banks at date
1,  = 1 + 2 be their total reserves and  = 1 + 2 be their total deposits. The
combined pro￿ts of the merged banks are then given by
Π =( 
1 − )1 +( 
2 − )2 −
Z 	
	
( − )() (10)
− [1(1 − (1)) + 2(1 − (2))].
The ￿rst two terms in (10) represent the combined pro￿ts from the loan market, with  ≤ 1
re￿ecting potential eﬃciency gains in the form of reduced loan provision costs, the third term
is the total expected cost of re￿nancing, and the last one is the total expected repayment
t od e p o s i t o r s .T h eo p e r a t i o no ft h ei n t e r n a lm o n e ym a r k e tc a nb es e e ni nt h et h i r dt e r mo f
(10), where demands for liquidity and reserves are pooled together.
A preliminary step before deriving their optimal reserve-deposit ratio is to understand
the ￿deposit market policy￿ of the merged banks. Whether they raise equal or diﬀerent
amounts in both regions aﬀects the distribution of the demand for liquidity ,a n dt h u s
the size of the expected cost of re￿nancing. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The merged banks raise an equal amount of deposits in each region, i.e., 1 =
2 = 	
2 .
Lemma 1 shows that the merged banks not only raise deposits in both regions, but they
even do it symmetrically. Choosing equal amounts of deposits in both regions minimizes
t h ev a r i a n c eo f and maximizes the bene￿ts of diversi￿cation, thus reducing the expected
re￿nancing cost. (We will come back to this point in Section 6 when studying the eﬀect of
the merger on aggregate liquidity demand.)
Given 1 = 2, the merged banks choose reserves  so as to maximize their combined
pro￿ts in (10). Let  = 	
	 be the reserve-deposit ratio for the merged banks and recall
that 	
 is the one for banks in the status quo de￿ned in (9). The following proposition
compares these two ratios.
Proposition 2 The merged banks choose a higher reserve-deposit ratio than in the status
quo (  	
)i ft h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ￿nancing, 


,i sl o w ,a n dal o w e ro n eo t h e r w i s e .
Contrary to conventional wisdom ￿ suggesting that the diversi￿cation eﬀect of the internal
money market should lead the merged banks to reduce reserves ￿, Proposition 2 shows that,
as long as re￿nancing is not too costly, the merged banks increase their optimal reserve-
deposit ratio. The reason is that the typical diversi￿cation eﬀect is oﬀset by an internaliza-
tion eﬀect. When choosing reserves, the merged banks take into account (￿internalize￿) an
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at either of them.
The merger modi￿es the demand for liquidity  of the merged banks relative to the
demand for liquidity  of each individual bank in the status quo, and the relative cost of
re￿nancing aﬀects banks￿ reserve choices. As a sum of two independent liquidity shocks,
 is more concentrated around the mean than . Thus, the distribution of  gives a
lower probability to events with very low and very high liquidity demand than that of .
If the ratio 


 is low, both the merged banks and each individual bank choose relatively
small reserve-deposit ratios because re￿nancing is inexpensive. For any given small level of
this ratio, however, the merged banks would be able to cover their demand for liquidity less
frequently than the individual bank because of the thinner left tail of the distribution of
. The merged banks have therefore a higher marginal valuation of further reserve units
and increase their reserve-deposit ratio  above 	
 (the internalization eﬀect dominates
the diversi￿cation eﬀect).
The reverse happens if the relative cost of re￿nancing is high. In this case, all banks
tend to have high reserve-deposit ratios. For any given large level of this ratio, the merged
banks would experience liquidity shortages less often than an individual bank, because the
right tail of the distribution of  is thinner than that of the distribution of .T h i sm a k e s
the merged banks have a lower marginal valuation of further reserve units, and it induces
them to decrease their reserve-deposit ratio (the diversi￿cation eﬀect dominates).
4.2 Cost Structures, Choice of Loan Rates and Balance Sheets
We now examine how the merger modi￿es the equilibrium in the loan market and banks￿
balance sheets. Consider ￿rst banks￿ cost structures. As noted earlier, competitors have the
same cost structure as in the status quo. Each of them pays a per-unit loan provision cost
 and per-unit ￿nancing costs
√
 (from Proposition 1).
By contrast, the cost structure of the merged banks changes in two ways. First, their
loan provision costs reach , where the parameter  ≤ 1 represents the potential eﬃciency
gains that the merger induces for the processing of loans. Second, the emergence of the
internal money market aﬀects the merged banks￿ expected costs of re￿nancing. We have
the following result.
Lemma 2 The merged banks have lower ￿nancing costs than competitors.
This advantage for the merged banks is endogenous to the model in that its size is determined
by their optimal reserve choices.
The following proposition describes the post-merger equilibrium with symmetric behav-
ior within the ￿coalition￿ (merger) and among competitors.









is characterized as follows:
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2 ( − );
3. The merged banks raise total deposits  = 1




where ,  are the total marginal costs of the merged banks and of the competitors,
and  and  are their respective optimal reserve-deposit ratios.9
Since banks compete in strategic complements, in equilibrium the loan rates of competitors
move in the same direction as the loan rates of the merged banks. Both 
 and 
 are a
weighted average of the mark ups that banks can charge and of the total marginal costs
 and . All marks ups are higher than those in the status quo equilibrium (see 
	
 in
Proposition 1), but as the merged banks gain market power, they charge a higher mark
up than competitors. By contrast, their total marginal cost  is lower than those of the
competitors, as the merged banks bene￿tf r o ml o w e r￿nancing costs (see Lemma 2) and
from potential eﬃciency gains in the provision of loans. Thus, the eﬀect of the merger on
equilibrium loan rates depends on the relative importance of the increased market power of
the merged banks as compared to their lower total marginal cost. Post-merger equilibrium
loan rates increase when the merger induces a small cost advantage relative to the increase
in market power, whereas they decrease otherwise.
Loan market shares across banks change in line with loan rates. As the merged banks
change their loan rates by more than competitors, their total loan market share shrinks
when loan rates increase and it expands otherwise, i.e.,   2	
  2 when 
  
 ,
and   2	
  2 otherwise.
The modi￿cation of loan market shares together with the change in the optimal reserve-
deposit ratio described in Proposition 2 determines the eﬀects on the sizes of banks￿ balance
sheets (as measured by the amount of deposits). Most importantly, a merger breaks the
symmetry in banks￿ balance sheets. Whereas in the status quo all banks have the same
deposits 	




9The expressions for 	, 
 a r ei nt h ep r o o fo ft h i sp r o p o s i t i o n ;t h o s ef o r	 and 
 are, respectively, in
the proof of Proposition 2 and in equation (9).
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An important implication of Propositions 2 and 3 is how the merger modi￿es banks￿ liquidity
risks and expected liquidity needs. The results for competitor banks are quite straightfor-
ward. As they follow the same optimal reserve rule as in the status quo, they face the same






 (see Corollary 1). Their expected liquidity needs, however,
change with their balance sheet, as  = 

2
. The merged banks experience more far
reaching changes in liquidity risks and needs.
Corollary 2 The merged banks have lower liquidity risk than a single bank in the status
quo.
This result derives directly from Proposition 2. When the relative cost of re￿nancing is low,
the merged banks increase their reserve-deposit ratio and their liquidity risk goes down. In
the other case, although they choose a lower reserve-deposit ratio than in the status quo,
they still keep it suﬃciently high to decrease the liquidity risk. This eﬀect is so strong that
the liquidity risk of the merged banks is not only lower than the risks of two banks in the
status quo, but it is even lower than that of a single bank.
Corollary 3 The merged banks have lower expected liquidity needs than in the status quo
if 	
  ,w h e r e2 ≤ 4, and higher ones otherwise.
The merger changes the merged banks￿ expected needs for three reasons. First, it creates
the internal money market, which reduces ceteris paribus expected liquidity needs. Second,
the merger modi￿es the merged banks￿ optimal reserve-deposit ratio, which reduces ceteris
paribus expected liquidity needs when the relative cost of re￿nancing is low. Third, the
merger changes the merged banks￿ deposits, and hence the size of their demand for liquidity.
Corollary 3 shows that the ￿rst eﬀect dominates unless cost advantages (eﬃciency gains and
reduced ￿nancing costs) and competition in the loan market (degree of loan diﬀerentiation

 a n dn u m b e ro fb a n k s) are so strong that the merged banks increase their balance sheets
substantially relative to two banks in the status quo.
5T h e E ﬀects of a Merger on Aggregate Liquidity
N o wt h a tw eh a v es e e nh o wam e r g e ra ﬀects the behavior of individual banks, we can turn
to its implications for the banking system as a whole. To see this, we analyze how changes
in banks￿ reserve holdings and in loan market competition modify the aggregate supply and
demand of liquidity.
We identify two channels. The ￿rst one we call reserve channel, as it works through
changes in reserve holdings. When looking at the system as a whole, the distinction between
the internal money market of the merged banks and the interbank market is blurred, and the
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the existence of the internal money market aﬀects the total supply of liquidity through the
change in the reserve holdings of the merged banks. The second channel is an asymmetry
channel,w h i c ha ﬀects the distribution of the aggregate liquidity demand. This channel
originates in the heterogeneity of balance sheets across banks, which − as shown above −
depends on both the diﬀerent amount of reserves and the diﬀerent loan market shares that
banks have after the merger.
We start with analyzing each of the two channels in isolation; then we examine how they
interact in determining aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs.
5.1 Asymmetry Channel without Internal Money Market
To isolate the working of the asymmetry channel, we assume for a moment that the merged
banks cannot make use of the internal money market. In this case, the merged banks do
not have any ￿nancing cost advantages, and they choose the same optimal reserve rule as
their competitors. As a consequence, the asymmetry in banks￿ balance sheets originates
only from the diﬀerent distribution of market shares due to loan competition.
Because all banks continue to choose reserves according to (9) and the aggregate demand
for loans is inelastic, the merger does not aﬀect the total amounts of reserves and deposits,
thus leaving the aggregate supply of liquidity unchanged. The heterogeneity of banks￿










=3  after the merger. Both
	
 and  are weighted sums of  uniform random variables, but in the ￿rst case weights
are equal and in the second case they diﬀer (according to deposit sizes). This brings us to
the main result about the asymmetry channel.
Proposition 4 Suppose the merged banks do not exchange reserves internally. Then:
1. The merger decreases aggregate liquidity risk if the relative cost of re￿nancing is suf-
￿ciently low, and increases it otherwise;
2. The merger always increases expected aggregate liquidity needs.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. As already mentioned for Lemma 1, moving
from a uniformly weighted sum of random variables (in the status quo) to a heterogeneously
weighted sum of random variables (after merger) increases the variance of the total sum.
Thus, as Figure 3 illustrates, the distribution of 	
 gives lower probability to extreme
events ￿ very low and very high realizations of the aggregate liquidity demand ￿ than that
of .
This change in the distribution of  reduces the aggregate liquidity risk if the relative
cost of re￿nancing is low because it increases the probability that the aggregate liquidity
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indicated by the vertical line
P
=1  ￿ are low and the area 1 − Φ is larger than the
diagonally striped area 1−Φ	
. The opposite happens when the relative cost of re￿nancing
is high.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Proposition 4 also states that the merger always increases the expected amount of public
liquidity needed. The reason is that the expected aggregate liquidity needs depend not only
on the frequency with which aggregate liquidity demand exceeds aggregate supply, but also
on the magnitude of each excess. As noted earlier, the merger increases the variance of the
distribution of  a n dt h u st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fe v e n t sw i t hv e r yl o wa n dv e r yh i g hd e m a n d s .
If banks do not hold reserves, these increases oﬀset each other and the expected aggregate
liquidity needs are the same before and after the merger. By contrast, when banks hold
positive reserves, they can cover the events with low aggregate liquidity demand. Hence, the
higher probability of extreme events with high aggregate liquidity demand is not outweighed
any more by the higher frequency of low demand events, and the expected aggregate liquidity
needs grow.
5.2 Interaction with the Reserve Channel
In this section we reintroduce the possibility for the merged banks to use the internal money











 +(  − 2)
(11)
the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio after the merger. Since competitors choose the same ratio
as in the status quo ( = 	
), the change in  is solely determined by the change in the
merged banks￿ reserve-deposit ratio. Hence, it follows from Proposition 2 that  increases
when the relative cost of re￿nancing is low (because then   	
), whereas it decreases
otherwise. The following lemma describes how the change in the aggregate reserve-deposit
ratio alone aﬀects aggregate liquidity.
Lemma 3 Suppose the merger does not cause any asymmetry in banks￿ balance sheets
( =2 ). Then, it decreases aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate needs if
t h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ￿nancing is low, and it increases them otherwise.
When the merger does not generate asymmetry across banks￿ balance sheets, it aﬀects ag-
gregate liquidity only through the reserve channel. The aggregate liquidity supply changes,
whereas the aggregate liquidity demand remains the same. Thus, the merger reduces both
aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs when the aggregate liquidity
supply increases through a higher reserve-deposit ratio of the merged banks. The opposite
happens when the aggregate liquidity supply falls.
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both the asymmetry and the reserve channel are at work. Depending on the size of the
relative cost of re￿nancing, the two channels can reinforce or oﬀset each other. Therefore,
we consider the cases of high and low relative cost of re￿nancing separately.
Proposition 5 If the relative cost of re￿nancing is high, the merger increases both aggregate
liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs.
When the relative cost of re￿nancing is high, the asymmetry channel and the reserve channel
work in the same direction. The asymmetry channel increases the variance of the aggregate
liquidity demand, and the reserve channel reduces the aggregate liquidity supply through
the lower reserve holdings of the merged banks. Both these eﬀects make the system more
vulnerable to liquidity shortages and more dependent on public liquidity provision.
Proposition 6 If the relative cost of re￿nancing is low, then:
1. There exists a critical level of the relative cost of re￿nancing such that the merger
reduces aggregate liquidity risk if the cost of re￿nancing is below such critical level,
and increases it otherwise.
2. For any small level of asymmetry induced by the merger, there exists a set of values of
t h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ￿nancing for which the merger reduces expected aggregate liquidity
needs.
When the cost of re￿nancing is low, the reserve and the asymmetry channels drive aggregate
liquidity in opposite directions, and the net eﬀect depends on their relative strength. As
shown in Lemma 3, the reserve channel reduces both aggregate liquidity risk and expected
liquidity needs. As stated in Proposition 4, however, the asymmetry channel always increases
expected aggregate liquidity needs, whereas it reduces aggregate liquidity risk only if the
relative cost of re￿nancing is suﬃciently low.
Thus, when the two channels interact, the merger reduces aggregate liquidity risk for a
larger range of parameter values than in Proposition 4, where only the asymmetry channel
is active. Similarly, it increases aggregate liquidity risk in a larger range of parameter values
than in Lemma 3, where only the reserve channel is present.
As for the expected aggregate liquidity needs, the reserve channel dominates when the
asymmetry induced by the merger is suﬃciently small. Thus, there is a range of values of the
relative cost of re￿nancing for which the merger reduces expected aggregate liquidity needs.
The larger the asymmetry in banks￿ balance sheets, the larger is this range of parameters
in which the merger increases expected aggregate liquidity needs.
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We now discuss in greater detail how mergers, loan market competition and reserve choices
interact in determining both loan rates and aggregate liquidity (for simplicity, here inter-
preted only as expected aggregate liquidity needs), and we draw some policy implications.
At the individual bank level, the loan market equilibrium aﬀects banks￿ reserve holdings
(in absolute terms) by determining the amount of deposits required to ￿nance loans, and
hence the size of liquidity demands at any given level of reserves. Equilibrium reserve
holdings determine banks￿ ￿nancing costs ￿ the sum of the expected cost of re￿nancing and of
the expected repayment to depositors ￿, and thereby in￿uence the loan market equilibrium.
At the aggregate level, loan market competition aﬀe c t st h ed e g r e eo fa s y m m e t r yi nb a n k s ￿
balance sheets through the distribution of equilibrium loan market shares.
Table 2 summarizes the possible eﬀects of the merger on both loan rates  and expected
aggregate liquidity needs Ω, as described in Propositions 3, 5 and 6. The rows of the table
indicate whether a merger is characterized by low or high eﬃciency gains in terms of reduced
loan provision costs (	

 high or low); the two columns show the cases of high and low relative




[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
When the relative cost of re￿nancing is low, the merger increases the aggregate reserve-
deposit ratio, and the ￿nal eﬀect on expected aggregate liquidity needs depends on whether
the positive reserve channel dominates the asymmetry channel. When the relative cost of
re￿nancing is high, the merger increases unambiguously expected aggregate liquidity needs
because it reduces the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio. When eﬃciency gains are small, the
increase in market power dominates, and the merger increases loan rates. The opposite
happens when eﬃciency gains are large.
Cell I describes a case in which competition and liquidity concerns may be in con￿ict; loan
rates increase, whereas expected aggregate liquidity needs may fall. In this case, the merger
would be undesirable from a competition policy perspective, but it would be desirable from
the perspective of a central bank that does not want to frequently inject large amounts
of liquidity for the reasons discussed earlier. A similar con￿ict between competition and
liquidity concerns may emerge in cell II, where loan rates fall but expected aggregate liquidity
needs may rise. By contrast, in cell III the two concerns are aligned; the merger increases
both loan rates and expected aggregate liquidity needs. Finally, in cell IV competition and
liquidity concerns are always in con￿ict.
To see under which loan market conditions it is more likely that a merger causes a con￿ict
between competition and liquidity considerations, we now perform some comparative statics.
We restrict our attention to the scenario in cell I, since, as already discussed in Section 1,
bank mergers seem to produce limited eﬃciency gains, if at all positive. The following
lemma describes how changes in loan market conditions aﬀect equilibrium loan rates and
banks￿ balance sheets.
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(  2) . T h e n ,a ni n c r e a s ei ne ﬃciency gains, in the number of banks or in loan
substitutability increases the merged banks￿ balance sheets relative to the ones of the com-
petitors.
The larger the eﬃciencies generated by the merger − the lower  −, the lower the equilibrium
loan rates, and the larger the loan market shares of the merged banks relative to competitors.
This implies larger deposits for the merged banks, due to both higher loan market shares
and higher reserve-deposit ratios. Similarly, an increase in competition ￿ either through an
increase in the number of banks  or through a higher loan substitutability 
 ￿ reduces
all equilibrium loan rates, but relatively more those charged by the merged banks, thereby
increasing their relative size.
The following proposition discusses how an increase in merged banks￿ balance sheets
aﬀects expected aggregate liquidity needs.
Proposition 7 Suppose mergers reduce merged banks￿ balance sheets (  2). Then,
an increase in eﬃciency gains, in the number of banks or in loan substitutability reduces
expected aggregate liquidity needs if the relative cost of re￿nancing is low.
In the parameter region where   2, the increase in the merged banks￿ balance sheets
caused by stronger eﬃciency gains reduces the asymmetry across banks and tends to reduce
expected aggregate liquidity needs. If the relative cost of re￿nancing is low, this eﬀect is
reinforced by a parallel increase in the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio. Analogously, by
increasing merged banks￿ relative size, a higher substitutability of bank loans weakens the
asymmetry channel, and increases the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio. This reduces expected
aggregate liquidity needs. The same happens when the number of banks increases.
Proposition 7 has important policy implications. Under the rather plausible parameter
ranges considered, more competitive loan markets (lower ,h i g h e r and 
)a r eb e n e ￿cial
for interbank liquidity. As long as the relative cost of re￿nancing is low, mergers withdraw
less liquidity from the interbank market when they lead to eﬃciency gains and take place in
a more competitive environment. By implication, a successful competition policy in banking
will also limit the expected amounts of liquidity a central bank has to inject in the banking
system. In this sense competition and liquidity considerations may go ￿hand in hand￿.
7 Discussion
In the model we introduce a merger in a situation where all banks are identical ex ante. This
means that the merger leads to some degree of heterogeneity in banks￿ sizes. In doing this,
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movement of the 1990s as shown in Table 1, not every merger leads to a more asymmetric
banking system. For example, in a situation where the system is composed of a group of
small banks and another group of large banks, mergers among the small banks would have
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect. This con￿guration reverses the functioning of the asymmetry channel
described in Section 5. A merger that makes the banking system more symmetric is, ceteris
paribus, more likely to moderate aggregate liquidity ￿uctuations. Even in this situation,
however, ￿nancial consolidation can still cause greater liquidity risk and larger expected
aggregate liquidity needs, when it induces a reduction of banks￿ reserve holdings.
We show in Section 4 that, when the relative cost of re￿nancing is low, the presence of
an internal money market leads to an increase in the reserve-deposit ratio of the merged
banks, and thus to a larger total supply of liquidity in the system. This seems to be the
empirically more plausible range of interbank and deposit rates. It is important to note
though that the precise levels of the relative cost of re￿nancing ￿ which we indicate as low
or high ￿ are rather of an indicative nature, because relaxing some assumptions can change
those levels. First, the exact size of the range depends on the distribution of liquidity shocks.
We have assumed  to be uniformly distributed on the support [01]. Limiting the support
to a fraction of the unit interval would reduce the range of the relative cost of re￿nancing
for which reserves increase with the merger. Assuming another symmetric density function
would also change the relevant range, although it would not change the qualitative results.
Second, in the model we neglect price eﬀects in the choice of reserves by assuming that all
banks pay the same rate  to obtain liquidity. It may be argued that in reality this needs
not always be the case. Large banks (in our case merged banks) might pay a slightly lower
r a t e ,f o re x a m p l eb e c a u s ei ns o m es m a l l e rc o u n t r i e st h e ym a yh a v em a r k e tp o w e ri nt h e
interbank market or because they may be perceived as safer thanks to expectations about
￿too big to fail￿ policies. If present, these forces would act against the internalization eﬀect
of the internal money market, further limiting the range of parameters for which merged
banks increase reserves.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Using Leibniz￿s rule and (1), from (8) we obtain the ￿rst order conditions with respect to























=0  for  =1 


,( 1 2 )
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= ( + )2 − 2
 =0  for  =1 


.( 1 3 )






.( 1 4 )
Solving (12) for 
 in a symmetric equilibrium where 
 = 
	




(2) and (14) gives
	 +( 
	










 follow. Substituting then 
	
 in (2) gives 	




 in (1), we obtain 	
. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
Solving (3) and (4) gives  =1− 
 and  =
()2
2 −+ 
2 . Substituting the expressions
for 	
 and 	
,w eo b t a i n	
 and 	
 as in the corollary. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that the variance of the liquidity demand  of
the merged banks is minimized when deposits are raised symmetrically in the two regions.
Second, we show that the expected liquidity needs of the merged banks (and therefore their
re￿nancing costs) are lower when deposits are symmetric.
Step 1. De￿ne the liquidity demand of the merged banks as
 = 1! + 2(1 − !),
where ! ∈ [01] indicates the fraction of deposits that the merged banks raise in one region
and (1−!) the fraction they raise in the other region. Since 1 and 2 are independent and
"# (1)="# (2), the variance of  is simply
"# ()=!22
"# (1)+( 1− !)22
"# (2)
= "#  (1)[!22
 +( 1− !)22
].
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 "# ()
 !
=2 2"#  (1)(2! − 1) = 0,
which has a minimum at ! = 1
2.
Step 2. De￿ne now the liquidity demand of the merged banks as
 = 1! + 2(1 − !),
when ! 6= 1







when ! = 1
2. Applying the general formula in Bradley and Gupta (2002) to our case,
the density functions of  and 	 can be written as (assume !1








	 for  ≤ !
1
(1−)	 for !   ≤ (1 − !)
	−	
(1−)2







	 for 	 ≤ $2
4(	−	)
2
	 for 	  $2.
(15)
Since !1
2, () is steeper than 	(	) both for  ≤ ! and for  
(1 − !). This implies that the two density functions do not cross in these intervals,
whereas they do it in two points in the interval !   ≤ (1−!).G i v e nt h a tt h e y
are symmetric around the same mean $2 with "# () "# (	),i ti s :
% % 	 for  

2
,( 1 6 )




where % =P r (   ) and %	 =P r ( 	  ).
Denote now as  and 	 the expected liquidity needs of the merged banks with asym-
metric deposits and symmetric deposits respectively. We have
 − 	 =
Z 	
	











−(1 − %()) + (1 − %	()).
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( − 	)

= −()+	() − (1 − %())
+()+( 1− %	()) − 	()
= %() − %	().
From (16) it follows
(	−	)
	  0 for   	
2 and
(	−	)
	  0 otherwise. This,
along with  − 	 =0both for  =0and for  =  implies  − 	  0 for
all  ∈ [0 ]. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2




2  has density function
as in (15). Using Leibniz￿s rule, the equality  =  + 1 + 2 and the ratio  = 	
	,











 for  ≤ 1$2
8
3(1 − )3 = 


 for   1$2.
(18)
The term on the LHS of the equalities is the marginal bene￿t of increasing the reserve-deposit
ratio, that is the reduction in the expected need of re￿nancing induced by a marginal increase
of the reserve ratio. The term on the RHS of the equalities is the ratio between the marginal














 for   3,
(19)





 )=0in the interval (0 1
2]
increasing in the ratio 


.S i n c e(0)  0, (1$2)  0 and 0(&)  0, &( ) is the unique
real solution.
To compare  with 	
, we rearrange 	




 ,( 2 0 )
where, as before, the LHS is the marginal bene￿t of increasing the reserve-deposit ratio and
the RHS is the ratio between the marginal cost of raising deposits and holding reserves 
and the marginal cost of re￿nancing .
Denote as () the LHS of (18) and as (	
) the LHS of (20). Plotting () and
(	
) for 	
 and  b e t w e e n0a n d1 ,w eg e tF i g u r e4 .
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
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) cross only once at 	
 =  = 5
8. Substituting this value in
(18) or (20) gives 	









9 ,a n d  	

otherwise. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2













 =  and 


 =1−  in (21) and rearranging terms, we obtain
(1 − )2 + 
2(1 − )
.( 2 2 )
Analogously, from the last two terms in (10), using 	
	 =  and 	
	 =1− , we obtain












6(1−	) for   3.
(23)
It is easy to check that when the merged banks set  at the level which is optimal for
competitors, the ￿nancing costs of the merged banks are always lower than the ones of the
competitors. A fortiori this must be true when they set  to minimize their ￿nancial costs.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The merged banks choose 
1 and 
2 to maximize (10) while competitors choose 
 to
maximize (8) where the subscript  is now .D e ￿ne from the ￿nancing costs in Lemma 2
((22) and (23)) the total marginal costs of the competitors and the merged banks as
 =  +


















6(1−	) for   3,
(25)
respectively. Using the expressions for  and  in (19) and (20), those for  and  in
(24) and (25),  =  + 1 + 2 and  =  + , we can write the expected pro￿ts
for the merged banks and competitors when reserves are chosen optimally as
Π = 
1 1 + 
2 2 − (1 + 2)
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
1 − ),
where
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 respectively in (26) and in (2) gives the equilibrium  and . Analogously, we
derive  and . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2
Using (15), we can express the liquidity risk for the merged banks as














	  for   3.









	 for   3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 for  ≤ 3
2(1 − )2 for   3.
Substituting  as in (19), we can express the merged banks￿ resiliency as













 )2 for   3.












immediately sees that 1−  1−	
 always holds, so that   	
. The plot is available
from the authors upon request. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3
Using (15), we can express the expected liquidity needs for the merged banks as
 =

   
   
R 	
2
















	  for   3.
Solving the integrals, we obtain  = 	





















 for  ≤ 3
2
3(1 − )3 for   3.
To compare  with 2	
, we substitute (19) in the above expression for  and (20) in
the expression for 	











 − (1 − 	
)
2 	









for   3.
For   3 it is immediate to see that −2	
  0 if 	
  4.F o r ≤ 3, −2	

c a nb er e a r r a n g e da s
 − 2	


















Suppose for a moment  = 	
 and  =2 	









, which is negative because 	
  1$2. To see that this holds also for
  	


























Denote now ' =
¡1




.S i n c e' is decreasing in  and   	
 for  ≤ 3,
it follows  − 2	
  0 when  =2 	
. The same holds for 	





 −1)f o r	
  2 and 


 ∈ (13], one sees that there is a level  ∈ (24)
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 such that  ≤ 2	
 if 	
 ≤ ,a n d  2	
 otherwise. The plot is
available from the authors upon request. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
T h i sp r o o fi sag e n e r a l i z a t i o no ft h a to fL e m m a1 . L e t denote the total deposits
	
 =  +(  − 2),a n dl e t denote the total reserves 	
 =  +(  − 2).
Applying the general formula for the distribution of a weighted sum of uniformly distributed
random variables in Bradley and Gupta (2002) to our model, we obtain the density functions
of the aggregate liquidity demands in the status quo 	
(	









































( − 2)!()−2 .
The two density functions are plotted in Figure 3. The density 	
(	
) is more concentrated
around the mean than (). To verify that this is always the case, we compare the
variances of 	




















































 by Lagrangian maximization. Hence, it is al-
ways "# () "#  (	
).S i n c e (	
) and () are well behaved (they approach
a normal distribution), they intersect only in two points.10 This, along with the sym-




"# () "# (	
), implies
Φ	
 =P r ( 	




and vice versa for   

2 . Using Proposition 1,  = 	






  4.T h e￿rst statement follows.
10A formal proof that this is the case is in Manzanares (2002).
































−(1 − %()) + (1 − %	
()).









= %() − %	
().
As showed earlier, %() − %	
()  0 for   

2 and %() − %	
()  0
for   

2 .A l s o , %(0) = %	
(0) = 0 and %()=%	
()=0 . This implies
Ω − Ω	
  0 for all  ∈ [0 ]. The second statement follows. Q.E.D.





9 . In this range, the aggregate reserve/deposit ratio in the status
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 +(  − 	
)	
.
Given   	

























































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Proposition 4 implies that if  = 	
,t h e nΦ  Φ	
 and Ω  Ω	





fortiori this must be true in equilibrium where   	
 (Φ and Ω are decreasing in ,
which falls with ). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Statement 1. From the proof of Proposition 4,  = 	









  4.S i n c e  	


















9 , Φ  Φ	
 (from Proposition 5); hence, there
must exist a critical level ( ∈ (4 64




 ( ,a n dΦ  Φ	

otherwise. The ￿rst statement follows.














9 . This induces the same relation between  and 	
,s ot h a t − 	
 is
￿rst increasing and then decreasing in the interval 


 ∈ (1 64
9 ). By Proposition 4, when
 6=2  there is a neighborhood of 


 =1where Ω − Ω	





and  6=2 , Ω  Ω	
.W h e n


 =1 ,i ti sa l w a y sΩ = Ω	
 = 

2 . From Lemma
3, when  =2  it is Ω − Ω	
  0 for all 


 ∈ (1 64






By continuity, if one ￿xes a suﬃciently small level of asymmetry in the deposit bases across
banks ( − 2 suﬃciently small), then Ω − Ω	




 =1 .G i v e n t h a t  − 	
 is increasing around 






,n a m e d(, such that if the merger generates that asymmetry when 


 = (,t h e n
Ω−Ω	
 =0and Ω−Ω	
  0 in the immediate right neighborhood. Again by continuity,
Ω−Ω	




9 .G i v e nt h a t−	
 is decreasing




9 , there will be a smaller ratio 


,n a m e d(,s u c ht h a t ,w h e n 


 = ( then
Ω−Ω	
 =0and Ω−Ω	
  0 in the immediate left neighborhood. The second statement
follows. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Consider the parameter . From Proposition 3, it is easy to check  
$   0 and
 
 $   0. Since banks compete in strategic complements, it is also  
$    
 $ 
and consequently  $    $ .G i v e n = 1
1−	 and  = 1
1−
,i tf o l l o w s
 ($2)$   0. Analogous reasoning applies for the parameters 
 and . Q.E.D.





9 , the aggregate reserve/deposit ratio  increases (reserve channel). By
Lemma 3, this implies lower aggregate liquidity risk and lower expected aggregate liquidity
needs. By Lemma 4, a decrease in  (an increase in  or 
) increases the ratio $2,
which, in the range   2, reduces the asymmetry in the deposit bases, and, conse-
quently, the variance of the aggregate liquidity demand (asymmetry channel). This last




9 .T h e s t a t e m e n t
follows. Q.E.D.
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